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Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Law: The Battle over the Forest 




On November 9, 2000, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, the secretary of 
Agriculture issued the final rule revising the regulations implementing the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA). This decision was the culmination of a nearly decade-long process of 
redefining the mission of the USDA Forest Service. In a striking departure from the agency’s 
historical emphasis on multiple use, the rule established ecological sustainability as the key 
objective guiding planning for the national forests. The supporting material for the rule explicitly 
states that “it is based on the recommendations of an eminent committee of scientists” (11/9/00 
press release). The secretary appointed the Committee of Scientists in 1997, and the committee 
issued its report March 15, 1999. The new policy was not in place for long, however. The Bush 
administration suspended the rule in May 2001, and in November 2002 issued a new proposed 
rule that would reverse of number of changes embodied in the Clinton rule. 
This paper examines the Committee of Scientists and the Clinton NFMA rule as a case 
study in the relation between science and politics in the development and implementation of 
statutory standards for management of the National Forest System. It begins with a brief review 
of principles guiding the relations between Congress, courts, agencies, and experts in the 
American administrative state. It then considers these principles in light of the recent reality of 
                                                 
∗ Department of Forest Resources Management, University of British Columbia, 604 822 3728 (phone), 604 822 
9106 (fax), hoberg@interchange.ubc.ca. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the University of Montana 
School of Forestry and Resources for the Future, “Collaboration and Decision-making on the National Forests: Can 
It Work? Four Perspectives of the Potential Problems and Opportunities.” January 22–23, 2001, University of 
Montana, Missoula. I am grateful for comments from Roger Sedjo, Ross Gorte, Steve Daniels, and Jim Lyons. 
Research for this paper has been supported by Resources for the Future and the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada. 
 Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
2 
forest policymaking in the modern era of fractious natural resource politics. Third, it analyzes the 
evolution of planning under NFMA, with a focus on the first Committee of Scientists and the 
diversity provisions of the statute. Fourth, it analyzes the origins, mandate, and output of the 
Committee of Scientists. Fifth, it examines how the Forest Service during the Clinton 
administration responded to the committee. Sixth, the changes proposed by the Bush 
administration in late 2002 are briefly reviewed. The conclusion considers the broader question 
of whether the Committee and the Forest Service in their development of the Clinton NFMA rule 
overstepped their appropriate roles in promoting what is essentially a new statutory mandate. 
The paper concludes that indeed they did but emphasizes the dilemmas of how an 
administrative agency should act in the context of shifting societal values and scientific 
understandings, on the one hand, and a stalemated Congress incapable of acting, on the other 
hand. At the outset I want to make my position very clear. Personally, I think that ecological 
sustainability should be the highest priority on U.S. federal lands. However, I am troubled by 
how this value found its way into federal law. I think it is important to distinguish preferences for 
policy outcomes from principles about how institutions ought to work. Otherwise, the legitimacy 
of the system is further tarnished. Recent federal forest policy runs this risk. We need a new 
understanding of the appropriate boundaries between science, politics, and law in federal forest 
policy. 
 
1. The Theory and Reality of Policymaking in the Modern Administrative State 
The American system of policymaking has a clear set of principles governing the 
relations between various actors in the process. Congress, acting on the preferences of the voters 
who elected it, makes laws that establish the objectives for programs. Administrative agencies, 
with congressional grants of authority and appropriations of funds, implement the objectives 
established by Congress. In pursuing their statutory mandates, agencies are expected to marshal 
expertise, from both within and outside the agency. The role of the courts is to ensure that 
agencies do not deviate from their statutory mandates (Dodd and Schott 1979). 
Of course, things are not quite so simple. Citizens rarely pay sufficient attention to 
complex policy issues to allow politicians to judge their preferences, and interest groups eagerly 
fill the vacuum, creating a cacophony of claims to represent the public interest. The legislative 
process is extraordinary complex, riddled with opportunities for those who control veto points to Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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frustrate the will of the majority. When Congress and the president are controlled by the same 
party, 60% majorities are needed to overcome the filibuster in the Senate. When the two 
branches are controlled by different parties, the effective majority is 67%, the amount needed to 
overcome a presidential veto (Krehbiel 1998). Members of Congress, either because they do not 
understand the complexities of policy issues or because they cannot agree among themselves, 
typically adopt legislation that is too vague to address conflicting objectives (Schoenbrod 1993; 
Mortimer 2002; McCubbins et al. 1989). As a result, administrative agencies are left the task of 
clarifying the objectives and developing detailed programs. Policy frequently results from a 
complex interaction between agencies and reviewing courts, with Congress episodically 
reasserting itself through the budgetary process or, less frequently, legislative change. 
The role of science and expertise in the policy process is also exceptionally complex. The 
traditional view of the politics-administration dichotomy, in which politics provided the values 
and administrators provided the expertise, has long since faded. Science can rarely answer with 
an adequate degree of certainty the questions policymakers pose (Weinberg 1972). As a result, 
science becomes politicized, as interest groups adopt whatever factual claims support their 
views, and policy conflicts frequently become heated disputes between credentialed experts 
(Mazur 1973). 
 
2. The Pluralist Forest Policy Regime 
How does all of that play out in federal forest policy? Interest groups pursue the venue 
where they perceive they have the best advantage.1 Historically, industry groups have benefited 
from a cozy relationship between the Forest Service and regional delegations of Congress 
working through the appropriations process. Traditionally, forest management was a regional 
concern dealt with by the regional delegation of Congress through the appropriations process 
(Culhane 1981; Yaffee 1994). But in the 1970s, environmental groups broke up that iron triangle 
by getting the courts to intervene, and then by appealing to a more national political audience 
through the authorization process in Congress. Not trusting the agency to comply with its 
preferences, Congress appointed a scientific committee to keep watch. When this new system 
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didn’t result in adequate policy change, in the late 1980s environmentalists went back to the 
courts, new science in hand, and got injunctions in the Pacific Northwest. The industry and 
regional political delegations fought back through the appropriations process, and the 
beleaguered agency thrashed around in vain for an acceptable solution. But the courts wouldn’t 
let go, and eventually a new president, acting on the advice of a scientific panel he 
commissioned, imposed a solution for that region that the courts accepted. With the political 
process paralyzed by divided government, the agency gradually went through a transformation of 
its own. With the help of its own scientific committee, it asserted its own new ecofriendly 
mission for the entire National Forest System. 
The development that ultimately undermined the traditional forest policy regime was 
litigation in 1975 by environmental groups to halt clearcutting.2 Conservationists found an 
obscure provision of the original authorizing statute of the Forest Service, the 1897 Organic Act, 
that required harvested trees to be “dead or matured” and to be marked before being cut. 
Although these requirements were legislated even before the development of the forestry 
profession in the United States, the court refused to defer to the Forest Service’s interpretation of 
the statute’s meaning and enjoined clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest in West 
Virginia and the Tongass National Forest in Alaska. By outlawing the most common method for 
harvesting timber, these rulings created a crisis in timber management. Congress was forced to 
rewrite forest management laws to address the impasse (Le Master 1984, Chapter 4; Wilkinson 
and Anderson 1987). 
In revising the statute, Congress was acting in a political environment far more favorable 
to environmental interests. The mobilization of environmental groups and more environmentally 
oriented public opinion elevated environmental protection as a policy objective and downgraded 
traditional timber interests. The court-imposed clearcut ban also gave environmentalists and their 
supporters in Congress a strategic advantage, in that the alternative to new legislation was a very 
proenvironment status quo. 
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Adopted in 1976, the National Forest Management Act transformed forest policy in 
several ways. First, it shifted jurisdiction over forest policy from the appropriations committees, 
dominated by industry and regional interests, to authorizing committees far more sensitive to 
national environmental constituencies. Appropriations committees continued to be powerful 
vehicles for the representation of regional interests (Sample 1990), but they were now more 
effectively balanced by proenvironment authorizing committees. 
Second, NFMA elaborated the planning process, in which the Forest Service is required 
to prepare long-term, integrated plans for each national forest.3 This planning process 
transformed the forest policy process by dramatically expanding opportunities for public 
participation, intensifying the role of courts, introducing new government officials representing 
new values into the policy process, and eventually leading to a change in the scientific 
knowledge base underlying forest policy plans (Office of Technology Assessment 1992; Hoberg 
2001). 
Third, NFMA required changes in forest practice regulations to shift forest policy away 
from its historical emphasis on timber extraction. The clearcutting crisis created by the court 
rulings was resolved by permitting clearcutting but requiring the agency to institute forest 
practices protecting a wide range of resource values—water, fisheries, wildlife, soils, and so on. 
In developing these standards, the Forest Service imposed a number of restrictions on its own 
discretion (Wilkinson and Anderson 1987, 119). The most consequential turned out to be 
agency’s interpretation of that statute’s language for the protection of wildlife. NFMA requires 
that forest planning “provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the 
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use 
objectives” [16 U.S.C. sec. 1604(g)(3)(B)]. This diversity provision originated from two 
concerns. The first was an effort to increase the protection of wildlife in the agency’s multiple-
use equation, and the second was to restrict the conversion of native stands into exotic or 
monoculture plantations (Wilkinson and Anderson 1987, 123). The implementing regulations 
transformed this general guideline into a stringent requirement: “fish and wildlife habitat shall be 
managed to maintain viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate 
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species in the planning area” (Wilkinson and Anderson 1987, 296). This regulation would 
eventually lead to a fundamental transformation of forest policy. 
 
3. The Evolution of NFMA Planning  
Prior to the adoption of the 2000 revisions, NFMA planning rules went through an 
extraordinary evolution. An exceptionally vague statutory mandate to protect species diversity 
was clarified by a scientific committee and then agency rulemaking, and then transformed by a 
remarkable episode of judicial policymaking into sharp cutbacks in logging in one region. The 
approach to planning in that region, which changed the agency’s mission from multiple use to 
giving priority to ecosystem protection, then spilled over into other regions and filtered its way 
up to the agency leadership and finally was adopted as regulation. 
3.1 The first Committee of Scientists.  
When adopting NFMA, Congress took the novel step of requiring the secretary of 
Agriculture to appoint a committee of scientists to propose the implementing regulations for 
NFMA (Corbin 1999). The committee’s directive from Congress was as follows: 
…the Secretary of Agriculture shall appoint a committee of scientists who 
are not officers or employees of the Forest Service. The committee shall provide 
scientific and technical advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures 
to assure an effective interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted. The 
committee shall terminate upon promulgation of the regulations. The views of the 
committee shall be included in the public information supplied when the 
regulations are proposed for adoption. (sec. 6(h)(1)) 
This extraordinary initiative clearly reflects a deep congressional distrust for the capacity 
of the Forest Service to develop regulations in a manner reflecting the new statutory standards 
(Cooper 1996, 68). The committee played a direct role in writing the regulations that were 
adopted by the secretary of Agriculture in 1979. Its members clearly understood that they were 
doing more than providing scientific and technical advice. According to its chair, Arthur Cooper 
from North Carolina State, “We understood that we were helping to resolve policy issues that 
had been sidestepped by policymakers” (Cooper 1999, 17). Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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The implementation of the new regulations was stalled, however, when the Reagan 
administration targeted them for overhaul as part of Vice-President Bush’s Task Force on 
Regulatory Relief. The Reagan administration’s draft revision was met with a very strong 
environmental backlash. In response, the Forest Service reconvened the Cooper Committee of 
Scientists, and the committee helped the Forest Service rewrite the changes so that they very 
closely resembled the original regulations adopted in 1979. Thus, the Cooper committee was 
instrumental in writing the 1979 regulations and was then used in 1982 by the Forest Service to 
deflect pressure from its superiors to weaken the regulations (Daniels and Merrill 1992; 
Hartgraves 1992). 
This committee helped establish a pattern for the resolution of modern forest policy 
conflicts. Many of the issues were value questions of balancing conflicting objectives that were 
cast in technical terms to promote the social and political legitimacy of the outcomes. According 
to Steven Daniels, “Even though forestry’s most intractable dilemmas stem from differences in 
value hierarchies, debates about them tend to be cast in technical terms. As such, scientists are 
asked to resolve social questions as a fundamental as equity and appropriate rates of economic 
growth by focusing on technical natural resource issues that serve as convenient proxies” 
(Daniels 1992). We see this pattern continued with the Gang-of-Four report, the Interagency 
Committee of Scientists (ICS), the Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT), 
and finally the most recent Committee of Scientists. 
3.2 The judicial transformation of NFMA.4  
The new standards of the 2000 NFMA regulations have their origins in a remarkable 
episode of judicial policymaking involving the infamous northern spotted owl and the old-
growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. Environmental groups combined a lobbying strategy to 
nationalize the issue with a brilliantly successful litigation strategy to bring logging in the 
region’s forests to a virtual halt. In developing a response to these challenges, the Forest Service 
was forced to rely increasingly on the new science of conservation biology, which has 
revolutionized the ways the forests in the region are being managed. The Pacific Northwest was 
the crucible for forest policy changes that have spilled over into other regions and eventually into 
national policy. 
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The legal and political controversy over old-growth forests in the Northwest emerged in 
late 1987.5 There is a widespread perception that these legal conflicts centered on the 
Endangered Species Act. There was in fact litigation over whether the northern spotted owl 
should be listed, but it turned out to have little practical significance. Rather, the litigation 
centered on the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and particularly NFMA and its 
regulations on species viability. In December 1988, the Forest Service finalized its supplemental 
environmental impact statement on the spotted owl and issued new regional guidelines for its 
protection. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund sued in the district court in Seattle, and in 
March 1989, Judge William Dwyer ruled that the plan was inadequate and issued his first 
injunction on timber sales in Washington and Oregon. This injunction—as it turned out, the first 
of many—was a pivotal event in the history of Northwest forest policy because it changed the 
beneficiary of the status quo. Now, for affected timber sales to go forward, the Forest Service 
either had to comply with the judge’s strict interpretation of the law, or Congress had to take 
specific action to change the law as it applied in this case. Success in the judicial arena gave 
environmentalists new power resources in the executive and legislative arenas. 
The Northwest delegation to Congress sought to regain control over the issue by 
attaching riders to appropriations bills exempting relevant logging activities from lawsuits (Sher 
and Hunting 1991; Balmer 1990; Johnston and Krupin 1991). In response, environmentalists 
revamped their strategy, recognizing that as long as old-growth forests were considered a 
regional issue, they would continue to lose in Congress. According to Andy Kerr of the Oregon 
Natural Resources Council, “expecting the Northwest congressional delegation to be rational 
about ending the cutting of ancient forests in the late 1980s is like expecting the delegation from 
the American South to deal rationally with ending segregation in the late 1950s” (personal 
interview). Environmentalists understood that to succeed politically, they would have to 
nationalize the issue. Public opinion surveys show that there are significant differences between 
the national and regional publics on these issues, with the national public being consistently 
more proenvironment. The timing for the nationalization of the old-growth debate could not have 
been better, as environmental issues more generally were gaining extraordinary salience 
nationwide.  
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The revamped environmental strategy was extraordinarily successful. Although it 
resurfaced briefly in 1995 (see below), the use of appropriations riders to change forest policy 
had been largely delegitimized by environmental advocates’ concurrent political campaign to 
nationalize the issue. Legislators outside the region began taking an interest in the issue, and 
authorizing committees, whose statutes were being quietly rewritten, began to reassert their 
jurisdictional interests in the issue.  
The focus of the process returned to efforts by the Forest Service and associated agencies 
to develop a plan for the protection of the spotted owl that could win judicial approval. A 
haphazard plan put together by the hostile Bush administration was challenged in court, and 
Judge Dwyer again ruled in favor of environmentalists, chastising the government for “a 
deliberate and systematic refusal...to comply with the laws protecting wildlife.”6 The law he 
referred to here was the species viability section of the NFMA regulations. Dwyer ordered the 
Forest Service to develop “revised standards and guidelines to ensure the northern spotted owl’s 
viability” by March 1992 and enjoined timber sales until it did so. 
The Forest Service went back to work. This time, in addition to following proper legal 
procedures, the agency turned to the results of a scientific panel the administration had 
established in late 1989 (Yaffee 1994, 123–26). The Interagency Scientific Committee to 
Address the Conservation of the Northern Spotted Owl, chaired by Jack Ward Thomas, issued its 
report in May 1990, recommending the retention of large blocks of old-growth habitat. In March 
1992, the Forest Service adopted a new plan based on the “Thomas report,” setting aside about 8 
million acres of old-growth forest for spotted owl habitat. Environmentalists sued again. In late 
May 1992, Judge Dwyer rejected the Forest Service’s attempt to adopt the Thomas report as its 
spotted owl plan. The most striking part of the decision was his ruling that the plan was flawed 
because it did not adequately address issues related to species other than the spotted owl.7 
Continuing the pattern of previous cases, Dwyer imposed an injunction on timber sales until a 
satisfactory plan was put in place. 
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The decision stunned the Forest Service. Not only was the Thomas report, a state-of-the-
art scientific document in 1990, ruled inadequate, but the whole objective of the process was 
redefined by judicial order. The scope of the issue was significantly enlarged from one species of 
owl to an entire ecosystem. A far more sophisticated analytical process was necessary to address 
this larger problem. As a result, a new scientific committee was commissioned, again under the 
leadership of Jack Ward Thomas, this time called the Scientific Assessment Team. 
The Forest Service was not alone in marshaling scientific opinion to try to resolve the 
conflict. Congress gave its stamp of approval to the Interagency Scientific Committee that the 
administration had formed, and a year later commissioned its own assessment to examine old-
growth ecosystem issues beyond the northern spotted owl. The so-called Gang-of-Four report8 
had no impact on the stalemate over Northwest forests in Congress but was very influential in the 
options developed by subsequent scientific committees (Johnson 1997; Gordon and Lyons 1997). 
With Clinton’s election, the executive arena was transformed, with protimber officials 
being replaced by proenvironmental ones. Making good on a campaign promise, the 
administration held a “forest summit” on April 2, 1993, in Portland, Oregon. The president, vice-
president, and six Cabinet officials spent an entire day around a table listening to presentations 
on one regional issue. In his closing remarks, Clinton committed his administration to the 
development of a plan that is “scientifically sound, ecologically credible, and legally 
responsible” (Pryne and Matassa 1993).  
To implement this commitment, the Clinton administration established the Forest 
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team. FEMAT was a bigger and broader group than any of 
the previous committees. In addition to examining management strategies to preserve the 
viability of the owl and the marbled murrelet, FEMAT was also charged with examining the 
“maintenance and/or restoration of habitat conditions to support viable populations, well 
distributed across their current range, of species known (or reasonably expected) to be associated 
with old-growth forest conditions” (FEMAT 1993, II-5). The team assessed 10 management 
options, many of them developed by the Gang-of-Four report, on a broad range of consequences, 
ranging from the viability of more than 1,000 species to impacts on timber supply and related 
employment. 
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The Clinton administration selected Option 9. The resulting Northwest Forest Plan, 
announced on July 1, 1993, called for an annual harvest level of 1.2 billion board feet (bbf), 
which FEMAT concluded was the maximum cut permissible under current law. In addition, the 
plan provided for extensive reserves for spotted owl protection and dramatically expanded 
riparian reserves for the protection of fish habitat.9 
The compromise was bitterly attacked from all sides. Industry and labor groups said the 
dramatically reduced cuts would devastate timber-dependent rural communities. 
Environmentalists harshly criticized the size of the cut and especially the nature of the old-
growth reserves, which would not be inviolate: some logging for fire or insect salvage would be 
allowed, as would some thinning of second-growth stands to promote old-growth characteristics. 
Although environmentalists seemed as outraged as the timber industry and loggers, they 
had in fact achieved a remarkable victory. To put Clinton’s plan in perspective, one need only go 
back to 1989. During the debate over section 318 in 1989, environmentalists proposed an 
allowable cut level of 4.8 bbf per year—four times higher than the level they considered too high 
in 1993. This shift indicates the dramatic redistribution of power achieved after four years of 
effective lobbying in Congress, a successful public relations campaign to polish and nationalize 
the issue, and especially, a brilliant litigation campaign. 
Environmentalists were not satisfied, however, and once the plan was finalized in April 
1994, they challenged the plan in court again. This time industry challenged the decision as well, 
arguing that the process used to develop the plan violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 
In what began to mark the appearance of finality on this policy issue, Judge Dwyer upheld the 
Clinton forest plan in December 1994, brushing aside the criticisms from both sides.10 
The Republican “revolution” in Congress did bring the issue back to the fore, however. 
Although the GOP had relatively little success at rolling back environmental laws, one modest 
success was a rider to the 1995 Rescissions Act. Originally understood as an effort to facilitate 
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assistance package. 
10. Seattle Audubon Society et al. v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash 1994), upheld Seattle Audubon Society v. 
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the harvesting of fire- or insect-damaged trees, the rider has turned out to be far more sweeping, 
opening up areas of old-growth forests that had been protected in the Clinton forest plan and 
insulating many timber sales from citizen appeals and environmental reviews. Most of the 
political fight over forests in 1995 and 1996 involved this rider (Kriz 1996). Despite all the 
sound and fury, the rider expired at the end of 1996, and industry and its supporters in Congress 
appear to have little inclination to rejuvenate the strategy. The rider did increase logging, some 
of it in old-growth forests, but industry and environmentalists both agree that the total amount is 
extremely small—less than 1% of the remaining old-growth forest in the region.  
Environmental groups have remained vigilant in the administrative and legal arenas as 
well. When the Forest Service prepared timber sales without doing the wildlife surveys promised 
by the Northwest Forest Plan, environmental groups challenged the agency in court, in a 1999 
case. Judge Dwyer again agreed with the environmentalists and enjoined the sales.11 
This case study reveals the success of a concerted campaign by environmental groups to 
change forest policy in fundamental ways. Although they did not get everything they wanted, the 
case reflects an extraordinary victory for the environmental movement. The strategy can be 
boiled down to two tactics: nationalization and judicialization. The victory would not have been 
possible if the issue had remained regional, as forest policy traditionally has been. And it is 
perhaps the most extreme case of judicial intervention into environmental policymaking. From 
the time of his first injunction in 1989 to his approval of the Clinton forest plan in late 1994, 
Judge Dwyer essentially managed Region 6 of the Forest Service. When in 1999 the agency 
drifted from its previous commitments, Dwyer reemerged to force the agency to abide by strict 
interpretations of the 1994 plan. The impact on traditional measures of forest policy has been 
enormous. After peaking at 5.6 billion board feet in 1987, harvest levels in the region have fallen 
by a factor of 10—to 570 million board feet in 1999, well below the 1.2 bbf provided for in the 
Clinton forest plan. 
Environmentalists would respond that Dwyer was merely enforcing the law, and they 
have a point. The regulations promulgated to implement NFMA’s diversity requirements 
elevated the status of species protection in the agency’s multiple-use equations and forced the 
agency into unexpectedly preservationist decisions. As the priority given to nontimber values 
increased, the expertise of biologists and ecologists increased in importance, and so did their 
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influence in the region. The new science of ecosystem management, implied by NFMA viability 
regulations, began to take shape in the development and implementation of the Clinton forest 
plan. 
3.3 The spread to other regions.  
After the crisis in the Pacific Northwest, the agency began to reconsider its management 
of forests in other regions. In Alaska, the Forest Service began working on applying the concepts 
emerging from the Northwest to the Tongass National Forest. When the region issued its new 
management plan in 1997, it called for a 50% decrease in harvest levels.12 In the Pacific 
Southwest region, after protracted conflict (Ruth 2000), in May 2000 the Forest Service issued a 
new draft environmental impact statement for its proposed Sierra Nevada Forest Plan. The draft 
mentions two preferred alternatives, both of which would lead to significant reductions in harvest 
levels, especially after the first five years. Even the preferred alternative with higher proposed 
timber sale levels would reduce sales in the year 2005 to 50% below levels allowed under the 
1993 interim guidelines, and 80% levels before the spotted owl protections were put in place. 
The plan was finalized January 13, 2001. 
Another major effort involves the Columbia River Basin in eastern Washington and 
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. The Clinton administration created the Interior Columbia Basin 
Ecosystem Management Project, which is developing an integrated ecosystem plan for the 
region. Here the preferred alternative, announced in March 2000, would actually increase harvest 
levels, but the objectives of timber harvesting would undergo a profound change. Management 
objectives would shift from emphasis on timber production to emphasis on the restoration of 
forest health and old-growth ecosystems (USDA and USDI 2000, 27).  
4. The Committee of Scientists 
Developments in the Pacific Northwest, Alaska, the Columbia basin, and the Sierra 
Nevada all demonstrate the immense implications of the legal decisions arising from the 
interpretations, during the northern spotted owl case, of the viability regulations promulgated 
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under NFMA. Although the act was explicitly designed as a multiple-use statute, the 
implementation of its viability regulations forced the agency to subordinate timber production 
and other economic outputs to the preservation of ecosystems. As a result, the agency’s emerging 
de facto mission appeared to be in profound conflict with its official statutory mandate (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1999; Wilkinson 1997, 681). This has created serious tensions within 
the agency and in its political environment, leading several prominent observers to suggest that 
the Forest Service may have outlived its utility as a separate administrative entity (Sedjo 2000; 
Nelson 2002). 
The legislative stalemate of the 1990s made any statutory resolution of this issue 
unlikely. The Republican Congress opposes the shift toward greater concern with environmental 
values, but Democratic control of the White House up through 2000 ensured that any attempt to 
override the judicial decisions with new statutory language would be vetoed. In this vacuum of 
political leadership, the Forest Service attempted to redefine its own mandate. Mike Dombeck, 
chief of the Forest Service, made several speeches trying to hook a new ecosystem focus onto the 
watershed protection provisions of the ancient Organic Administration Act of 1897 (cited in U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1999, n. 7). 
More importantly, the agency appointed a Committee of Scientists in 1997 to review the 
land and resource management planning process. Note in particular the italicized words 
(emphasis added) in the charter of the committee: 
The purpose of this advisory committee is to provide scientific and 
technical advice to the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest 
Service on improvements that can be made in the National Forest System Land 
and Resource Management planning process. 
The Committee should address such topics as how to consider the 
following in land and resource management plans: biological diversity, use of 
ecosystem assessments in land and resource management planning, spatial and 
temporal scales for planning, public participation processes, sustainable forestry, 
interdisciplinary analysis, and any other issues that the Committee identifies that 
should be addressed in revised planning regulations. 
In its report, the Committee shall make recommendations on how best to 
accomplish sound resource planning within the established framework of 
environmental laws and within the statutory mission of the Forest Service. The 
Committee shall also provide technical advice on the land and resource 
management planning process; and provide material for the Forest Service to 
consider for incorporation into the revised planning regulations. The Committee 
shall also recommend improvements in Forest Service coordination with other Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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Federal land management or resource protection agencies, state and local 
government agencies, and tribal governments recognizing the unique roles and 
responsibilities of each agency in the planning process. 
The Committee shall consist of no more than 12 members and a 
Committee Chair appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. Officers or 
employees of the Forest Service may not serve as members of the Committee… 
The Committee shall consist of representatives of a variety of academic 
disciplines, including but not limited to, the following: forest and range ecology, 
fish and wildlife biology, silviculture, hydrology, natural resource economics, 
sociology, public participation and conflict management, ecosystem management, 
land management planning, and natural resource law. Committee members should 
have a demonstrated ability to work across scientific and resource management 
disciplines. Collectively, the members should represent a diversity of disciplines 
and perspectives, have a knowledge of the National Forest System, insights into 
the National Forest Management Act and its implementation, and National Forest 
System planning.13 
Note that nowhere does the charter ask for the committee to propose a new mission or 
objective for the agency. The committee members are listed in the following table. 
1998 Committee of Scientists Members 
Member Affiliation 
Dr. K. Norman Johnson (chairman)  Department of Forest Resources, Oregon State 
University 
Dr. James Agee  College of Forest Resources, University of 
Washington 
Dr. Robert Beschta  Department of Forest Engineering, Oregon 
State University 
Bob Cunningham  Environmental Compliance Manager, National 
Science Foundation  
Dr. Virginia Dale   Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory 
Dr. Linda Hardesty  Department of Natural Resource Science, 
Washington State University 
Dr. James Long  Department of Forest Resources, Utah State 
University 
Dr. Larry Nielson  School of Forest Resources, The Pennsylvania 
State University 
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Dr. Barry Noon  Department of Fishery and Wildlife Biology, 
Colorado State University 
Dr. Roger Sedjo  Resources for the Future 
Dr. Margaret Shannon  Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs, Syracuse University 
Dr. Ronald Trosper  School of Forestry, Northern Arizona 
University 
Dr. Charles Wilkinson  University of Colorado Law School 
Despite its title and its mandate to provide “scientific and technical advice,” the 
committee had no qualms about proposing new policy objectives for the agency.14 The 
committee urged the agency to consider sustainability its “guiding star.” When sustainability is 
defined as a triad of ecological, economic, and social elements the concept is not much different 
from old-fashioned multiple-use management: competing objectives are pursued within a larger 
framework to achieve societal objectives. 15 However, the committee clearly goes beyond that in 
declaring that ecological should be given priority over social and economic sustainability: 
The Committee recommends that ecological sustainability provide a 
foundation upon which the management for national forests and grasslands can 
contribute to economic and social sustainability. This finding does not mean that 
the Forest Service is expected to maximize the protection of plant and animal 
species and environmental protection to the exclusion of other human values and 
uses. Rather, it means that planning for the multiple use and sustained yield of the 
resources of national forests and grasslands should operate within a baseline level 
of ensuring the sustainability of ecological systems and native species. Without 
ecologically sustainable systems, other uses of the land and its resources could be 
impaired (USDA Committee of Scientists 1999, xvi). 
The committee presents its case for the primacy of ecological sustainability in Chapter 6 
of its report, as well as the synopsis. The case is made in two ways, factual and legal. The factual 
case is made following a recitation of the benefits that come from the forests.  
Such benefits include: clear air and water, productive soils, biological 
diversity, goods and services, employment opportunities, community benefits, 
recreation, and naturalness. they also provide intangible benefits such as beauty, 
inspiration, and wonder (xiv). 
                                                 
14 One committee member, Roger Sedjo of Resources for the Future, criticized his colleagues for attempting to 
assert what he believed was a new statutory mission for the agency (Sedjo 1999). 
15 For an elaborate discussion of the term ecosystem management and whether it represents a new paradigm of 
resource management, see Cortner and Moore (1999). Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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Although this sentence mentions goods and services, it is fascinating that the Committee 
doesn’t use the word timber. The committee continues: 
Yet these benefits depend upon the longer term sustainability of the 
watersheds, forests, and rangelands if the public is to enjoy the ecological, 
economic, and social values that these lands can provide. Accordingly, based on 
the statutory framework for the national forests and grasslands, the first priority 
for management is to retain and restore the ecological sustainability of these 
watersheds, forests, and rangelands for present and future generations (xiv). 
In expanding upon the legal case, the committee states that a “suite of laws call for 
ecological sustainability.” It refers to the Endangered Species Act, the diversity provisions of 
NFMA, and the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act’s call for “achievement and maintenance 
in perpetuity of a high-level or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the 
national forests without impairment of the productivity of the land” (145–46). The argument for 
a more ecologically defined mission is obviously stronger if statutes outside the core forest 
statutes are considered. The committee was well staffed to make such a legal assertion, as 
Charles Wilkinson is arguably the nation’s leading expert on forest law.  
What the argument overlooks, however, is that what forced all the action in the agency 
was not this broad suite of laws but the NFMA viability regulations. Even Assistant Secretary 
James Lyons has argued this in print.16 It is surprising that there is not a broader discussion in the 
report of the potential conflicts with the larger multiple-use mandate. For example, Mark 
Rutzick, a forest industry lawyer, makes a strong case that the legislative history of NFMA 
shows that the priority given to ecological values in the viability regulations is contrary to 
congressional intent. In both the House and the Senate, amendments to change the diversity 
section to make it more like the viability regulations were explicitly considered and rejected 
(Rutzick 2000). In a law review article, Wilkinson make the opposite argument, stating, “The 
agency seems increasingly to be imbued with the primacy of biodiversity as a management goal. 
Proceeding in this way is within the NFMA mission and procedures, because the Act was drafted 
in a sufficiently broad-gauged way" (Wilkinson 1997, 681). But neither his argument in the law 
                                                 
16 “Ironically, however, the injunctions against harvesting national forest old-growth timber in the region were not 
the result of legal challenges brought under the Endangered Species Act. Rather, they were based on the failure of 
the Forest Service to comply with its own regulations under the National Forest Management Act. Those regulations 
required the Forest Service to maintain the owl’s viability” (Gordon and Lyons 1997, 449). Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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review article nor the Committee of Scientists’ report specifically rebuts the claims made by 
Rutzick and colleagues.17 
But what I find even more striking is that the committee never makes a scientific case for 
the primacy of ecological sustainability. The room for making a case is certainly there. In the 
context of integrated resource management, both an economic and a scientific case can be made 
that competing benefits simply cannot be simultaneously provided, and one resource needs to be 
given priority. I take this to be the logic behind the committee’s factual assertion, but the report 
does not provide any evidence to support it. The closest it comes is the following paragraph: 
In addition to the suite of environmental laws calling for protection of 
ecological systems, scientific results and common sense point to the necessity of 
protecting forests and rangelands so they continue providing benefits to society. 
Lessons from across the National Forest System suggest that the conservation of 
ecological systems cannot be ignored. As an example, concerns over the effect 
that declining water clarity will have on tourism in Lake Tahoe have led to an 
intensive and expensive effort to reverse this trend…Once ecological systems are 
pushed to the edge, the costs of recovery can be high, and the ability to apply 
adaptive management is significantly compromised (xvi).18 
In the next paragraph, the committee does make an explicit fact-value distinction 
but then merely reasserts the factual claim. 
While the scientific community can help eliminate the risk associated with 
different management strategies, decisions about an acceptable level of risk are 
value-based, not science-based decisions…Nonetheless, it is clear that ecological 
sustainability lays a necessary foundation for national forests and grasslands to 
contribute to the economic and social components of sustainability…(xvi). 
If this prioritization of ecological sustainability is so self-evident, why didn’t Congress 
enshrine it in NFMA in 1976? If 25 years of working under NFMA have made this self-evident, 
where is the evidence and documentation? 
                                                 
17 These issues are also not addressed in a later article that explicitly addresses the Committee of Scientists and its 
role (Wilkinson 1999). 
18 There is also some explicit discussion of the conditions of forests, including a general statement about 
biodiversity concerns, in Chapter One (see especially  page 10). But these are not very detailed and they are not 
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I am not in any way arguing that the recommendations on ecological sustainability came as a 
surprise to the agency or were unwelcome. Even before the committee was named, the agency 
was expressing a new ecologically oriented mission in its strategic plans and annual report. For 
example, in its strategic planning exercise completed in 1997, the agency described its mission as 
follows:  
To sustain the health, productivity and diversity of the land to meet the 
needs of present and future generations…As the lead Federal agency in natural 
resources conservation, the Forest Service provides leadership in the protection, 
management, and use of the Nation’s forest, rangeland and aquatic ecosystems. 
Our ecosystem approach to management integrates ecological, economic and 
social factors to maintain and enhance the quality of the environment to meet 
current and future needs. Through implementation of land and resource 
management plans, the agency will ensure sustainable ecosystems and provide 
recreation, water, timber, minerals, fish, wildlife, wilderness, and aesthetic values 
for current and future generations on [National Forest System] lands. 
In pursuit of this mission, the agency adopted the following objectives: (1) ensure 
sustainable ecosystems, (2) provide multiple benefits for people within the capability of 
ecosystems, and (3) ensure organizational effectiveness (USDA 1997). The language of the first 
two objectives makes clear that timber harvest and other economic activities, including 
recreation, can be pursued only within the context of the dominant objective of ensuring healthy 
ecosystems.  
Thus, the conclusion of the Committee of Scientists were clearly consistent with the 
intentions of agency leadership. Nonetheless, the assertion of ecological sustainability as the 
primary goal of the agency appears to go beyond the committee’s mandate to provide scientific 
and technical advice. Moreover, to the extent that the committee supported this new objective 
with factual claims, it relied largely on mere assertion and did not provide any detailed factual 
rationale or scientific evidence. 
5. The 2000 Rule of the Clinton Administration 
The Department of Agriculture proposed a new rule for National Forest System planning 
in October 1999 (64 FR 54074, October 5). The proposal relied heavily on the ideas and 
language of the Committee of Scientists’ report. Section 219.2, “Goals and Principles for 
Planning,” explicitly states, “The goals and principles for planning are those recommended by 
the Committee of Scientists…” (54080). In the section designed to replace the species viability Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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section of the earlier rule, section 219.20 proclaims the agency’s commitment to ecological 
sustainability. The rationale states, “This section incorporates the key principles and desired 
outcomes for ecological sustainability that were outlined in the Committee of Scientists’ report” 
(54087). In justifying ecological sustainability, the rationale follows the lead of the Committee of 
Scientists and states, “The concept of managing the national forests and grasslands in an 
ecologically sustainable manner can be traced back over 100 years.” It then cites the same acts, 
from the Organic Act of 1897 to the Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA), 
Endangered Species Act, NEPA, and NFMA. 
In the preamble to the final rule, issued November 9, 2000, the agency explicitly 
addressed the criticism raised in the comment period that the preeminence given to ecological 
sustainability exceeded the agency’s statutory mandate. The agency responded as follows: 
Although some respondents perceived a conflict between emphasis on 
sustainable ecosystems and legislative mandates, the Department does not believe 
this is true. Instead, the Department sees ecological sustainability not only as a 
complement to multiple-use, sustained-yield management, but also a prerequisite 
for it. It is the Department’s view that the rule is consistent with the Forest 
Service’s conservation and legislative mandates. Contrary to some comments, the 
proposed rule did not change the overarching purpose of planning. Rather, it 
affirmed the direction in the MUSYA (67521). 
This statement is striking, given that section 219.2 of the proposed rule, entitled “Goals 
and principles for planning,” begins, “Goal: Planning must be directed toward assuring the 
ecological sustainability of our watersheds, forests, and rangelands” (54095). 
The criticisms about mandate did lead the Forest Service to change the language defining 
sustainability in section 219.1, “Purpose.” The proposal read, “Sustainability is broadly 
recognized to be composed of interdependent elements, ecological, economic, and social” 
(54095). The final rule directly linked that statement to the MUSYA mandate: "Sustainability, 
composed of interdependent ecological, social, and economic elements, embodies the principles 
of multiple-use and sustained-yield without impairment of the productivity of the land" (67568). 
In addition, section 219.2 was changed slightly to read, “The first priority for planning to guide 
the management the National Forest System is to maintain or restore ecological sustainability of 
national forests and grasslands to provide for a wide variety of uses, values, products, and 
services.” Both changes were clearly made to link ecological sustainability more directly to the 
formal statutory mandate of the agency. However, the final rule still asserted the primacy of Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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ecological sustainability and for that reason was vulnerable to the charge that it exceeded the 
multiple-use mandate established by Congress. 
6. The George W. Bush Administration Response 
The Bush administration clearly has a different approach to environmental issues 
generally, and forest policy in particular. In terms of personnel, Clinton’s Undersecretary of 
Agriculture Jim Lyons, an ally of environmental groups, was replaced by Mark Rey, who 
worked at the American Forest and Paper Association, the leading forest industry association, 
before serving on Senate GOP committee staff. The Bush administration moved quickly to 
review the new rule and in May 2001 issued a Federal Register notice suspending its application. 
In December 2002, the administration proposed a new rule, which if adopted would represent a 
marked departure from the 2000 rule and the 1982 rule it replaced (67 Fed. Reg. 72770-72815, 
December 6). 
Among the several significant changes in the Bush proposal, in the context of this 
analysis two in particular stand out. First, the administration proposes to remove the priority of 
ecological sustainability over economic and social sustainability. The new language emphasizes 
integration and balance: “This proposed rule emphasizes the interconnection between the 
ecological, social, and economic components of sustainability, and requires consideration of each 
in the planning process…In contrast to the 2000 rule, this concept of sustainability is linked more 
closely to the MUSYA in that economic and social components are treated as interdependent 
with ecological aspects of sustainability, rather than as secondary considerations” (67 Fed. Reg. 
72799). Thus, while embracing the modern term of sustainability, the Bush proposal reverses the 
Clinton rule’s new mission of prioritizing ecological sustainability, and returns to the balancing 
approach more consistent with the multiple-use mandate as traditionally defined. 
Second, the Bush proposal would eliminate the mandatory protection of species viability 
contained in the 1982 rules, and carried forward in the 2000 rule; instead, it outlines two options 
for the viability provision, neither of which contains mandatory language. The Bush proposal is 
compared with the earlier versions in the following box (emphasis added). Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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Given the pivotal role of the mandatory nature of the viability regulations in shaping the 
dramatic change in federal forest policy over the 1990s, the implications of these proposed 
changes are potentially immense. 
In other significant changes, the regulations would create a blanket exemption from 
NEPA for forest plans, create more flexibility in the application of environmental standards, and 
limit the appeals process for forest plans.  
If enacted, these proposals could fundamentally reshape policy on federal forest lands by 
undermining the twin pillars of the environmental groups’ strategy on federal forest policy: 
judicialization and nationalization. By removing the mandatory language in the viability 
 
1982 regulations. “Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable 
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area. For 
planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has the estimated 
numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence is well 
distributed in the planning area.” 36 CFR § 219.19. 
2000 regulations. “Plan decisions affecting species diversity must provide for 
ecological conditions that the responsible official determines provide a high likelihood that 
those conditions are capable of supporting over time the viability of native and desired non-
native species well distributed throughout their ranges within the plan area, except as provided 
in paragraphs (b) (2) (ii-iv) of this section.” 36 CFR § 219.20(b)(2).  
2002 draft regulations. Option 1: “Plan decisions should provide for ecological 
conditions that the Responsible Official determines provides a high likelihood of supporting 
over time the viability of native and desired non-native vertebrates and vascular plants well 
distributed within their ranges in the plan area.” Sec. 219.13(b)(2)(ii), 67 Fed. Reg. 72800.  
2002 draft regulations. Option 2: “Plan decisions, to the extent feasible, should foster 
the maintenance and restoration of biological diversity in the plan area, at ecosystem and species 
levels, within the range of biological diversity characteristic of native ecosystems within the 
larger landscape in which the plan area is embedded.” § 219.13(b)(2)(i), 67 Fed. Reg. 72802. 
 
Source: Mike Anderson, The Wilderness Society, comments on Proposed Regulations on National Forest 
Planning, December 11, 2002, at http://www.tws.org/newsroom/NFMADraftRegsAnalysis021211.doc 
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provisions, the regulation could undermine the legal basis used to force the agency to act to 
protect wildlife in several regions of the country. By reducing appeals and exempting forest 
plans from NEPA requirements, environmentalists would have fewer causes to bring action in 
court challenging Forest Service decisionmaking. By giving greater discretion to “responsible 
officials” in the regions, the proposed regulation is also designed to allow local managers to 
adapt management provisions to local circumstances, thus decentralizing decisionmaking. 
Environmentalists have been sharply critical of the proposal. Democratic members of 
Congress have also denounced it. In their critique, Democrats on the House Committee on 
Resources chastised the Bush administration for not relying on a committee of scientists in 
developing their proposal.  
Finally, we question why you have rejected the bipartisan precedent of 
three previous Administrations in declining to convene an independent 
Committee of Scientists to assist in revising the rule…There is good reason for 
this consistent precedent: the planning rule is too important to be shaped by 
partisan politics, but must be grounded in an independent assessment of 
applicable scientific principles. The Forest Service cannot credibly claim that it 
has relied on the Committee of Scientists convened for the 2000 rulemaking. The 
agency never solicited the views of this earlier Committee on this proposed rule, 
as the NFMA provides, nor did the Forest Service adopt the previous 
Committee’s recommendations for rigorous wildlife protection and monitoring 
provisions. We urge you to convene a Committee of Scientists before revising the 
rule (Committee on Resources (Democrats) 2002). 
Rather than demanding that Congress address the question of how ecological 
sustainability should be balanced with social and economic sustainability, or squarely address the 
question of whether protection of species viability should be mandatory, the representatives call 
instead for another committee of scientists. 
7. Conclusion 
The Johnson Committee of Scientists followed a long pattern of employing scientific 
advisers to help resolve difficult forest policy conflicts. When Congress enacted NFMA in 
1976,19 it didn’t trust the Forest Service to write its own regulations, so it gave the task to a 
                                                 
19 As Johnson shows, this pattern goes back even further, to assessment of the sustainability of timber outputs in the 
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committee of scientists. When the Forest Service wanted to deflect Reagan administration efforts 
to weaken those regulations, it reconvened the committee to help it. When the Democratic 
Congress was vexed by the controversy over the northern spotted owl, it commissioned the 
Gang-of-Four report. After having its own efforts flatly rejected by Judge Dwyer, the Bush 
administration turned to the ICS, and then the Scientific Assessment Team. When the Clinton 
administration took over, it turned to FEMAT. Thus the Johnson Committee of Scientists was 
not a new strategy in forest policy. However, the committee asserted a different role, and its 
results were used in an unprecedented way. None of the committees dealing with the Pacific 
Northwest spilled over into raw policy. Certainly, the Cooper committee did. For example, its 
transformation of the vague diversity provision of NFMA into the rigorous viability regulations 
was an exercise in policymaking. But the difference was that Congress had explicitly invited its 
participation. None of the scientific committees went as far as the Johnson Committee of 
Scientists in articulating a new mission for the agency. 
Forest management is a difficult challenge that involves complex questions of science 
and values. By continuing to cloak political choices about values in the language of science, 
American forest policy raises challenging questions about political accountability and the 
appropriate boundaries between experts and policymakers. Indeed, forest policy seems quite out 
of step on this issue compared with other environmental policy areas. The literature on risk 
management includes a long-standing and robust discussion of the relationship between facts and 
values. Early efforts to impose a stark distinction between facts and values have proven overly 
simplistic and been replaced by far more sophisticated discussions. The key insight has been that 
there is a very large gray area between fact and value, one that Alvin Weinberg called “trans-
science.” He defined the term as questions “which can be asked of science but not answered by 
science” (Weinberg 1972). In this area, it is necessary to make policy judgments to resolve the 
policy-relevant uncertainties. Sound decisionmaking attempts to explicitly identify the 
boundaries between science, trans-science, and policy, and utilize the appropriate approaches to 
addressing each. In articulating policies for the regulations of toxic substances, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration have 
worked very hard to clarify these boundaries since the late 1970s (Jasanoff 1987, 1990; Harrison 
and Hoberg 1994). 
Forest policy, however, has not been very effective at addressing these boundary issues. 
At least one of main actors holds a narrow view of the appropriate role of scientists. For 
example, in a paper he wrote before chairing the Committee of Scientists, Johnson defines a 
“science-based assessment” as “attempts to use science-driven information and techniques to Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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answer, or to help answer, questions formulated by politicians and other policy makers” 
(Johnson 1997, 397). He continues: “Scientists in these studies are at best hired hands and should 
not usurp the roles of decision maker, manager, or individual citizen in weighing public values” 
(1997, 407). However, the language and the reasoning used in the report, and the agency’s 
response to it, are not as clear about which issues are facts, which are values, and which lie in 
between. For a planning framework so intent on integrating the roles of scientists and a broad 
range of stakeholders, a clear understanding of these boundary relationships is very important. 
Did the Forest Service in the Clinton administration exceed its statutory mandate in 
making ecological sustainability the guiding star for planning? The agency and the committee 
argue that doing so is consistent with the laws guiding the Forest Service since its inception. 
There is certainly an element of truth in this, but the Congress of 1897, 1960, or 1976 would 
certainly not have understood that ecological sustainability would be pursued to the exclusion of 
other uses, especially timber harvesting, in the way that it has over the past decade. The courts 
have yet to squarely address this question. In its challenge to the Northwest Forest Plan, the 
industry argued that the NFMA viability rule was contrary to the NFMA statute, but Judge 
Dwyer waved it away with declaratory sentence.20 
Of course, it is the responsibility of Congress to establish the policy objectives of 
administrative agencies and oversee the activities of those agencies to ensure they do not depart 
from congressional preferences. But on this issue Congress has been paralyzed over the past 
several decades, and that has created the room for this administration assertion of policy. 
Regional delegations sympathetic to the industry have obtained temporary relief on several 
occasions, but the authorization process is stalemated. Neither side has been able to overcome 
the extraordinary majorities necessary to force statutory change through. What this means is that 
so long as agencies do not go outside the comfort zone of most members of Congress, they have 
a great deal of latitude for administrative policymaking. 
During Clinton’s administration, the Johnson Committee of Scientists and the Forest 
Service did little to help overcome the legislative stalemate. The committee did not recommend 
statutory change, even though it was not shy about an expansive interpretation of its mandate in 
other areas. One could argue that a committee of experts would have a responsibility to inform 
Congress that the modern reality of the contemporary National Forest System was incompatible 
                                                 
20 Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) aff’d 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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with the statutory framework. One could also argue that the expert agency has a duty to inform 
its legislative sovereigns in such a case, but the reality of modern American politics provides the 
opposite incentives. It is now the norm for presidents to do everything in their power to use 
whatever discretion can be read into statutes to pursue their policy interests, regardless of 
congressional intent. Indeed, with the rule on roadless areas and the chief’s directive banning 
old-growth logging, the NFMA rules were not even the most extreme case of administrative 
policymaking in the Forest Service during the Clinton years. 
By attempting to cloak those significant policy changes in the mantle of science, the 
agency risked delegitimizing science and undermining the democratic accountability of the 
system. By asserting the legitimacy of such changes without congressional endorsement, the 
agency also left itself vulnerable to reversal when the new administration with new forest policy 
preferences assumed power. This couldn’t be demonstrated more clearly than by the recent 
actions of the Bush administration.  Resources for the Future  Hoberg 
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